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Sketches for a Reparation Scheme: How
Could a German-Italian Fund for the IMIs
Work?
Filippo Fontanelli
Abstract Given the deadlock in the current negotiations between Germany and
Italy and the unavailability of judicial remedies for the victims, the two states could
set up a reparation scheme. This chapter sketches some of the main features of such a
hypothetical scheme, considering existing internal or international arrangements in
the context of transitional justice (the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility
and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft) scheme; the Australian
DART scheme; the deal between Japan and South Korea on reparations to ‘comfort
women’; the US/French schemes for reparations and restitution to holocaust victims;
the Eritrea/Ethiopia reparations scheme; and the Iraq/Kuwait scheme). In particular,
the emphasis is on the system of identification of the eligible victims, the question of
financing and the fate of pending and future judicial claims. Assuming the states’
willingness to explore this project, the chapter outlines some of the ways the scheme
could operate in practice, drawing from existing models.
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Should Germany and Italy decide to set up a joint compensation (or reparation)1 fund
for Italian Military Internees (IMIs) and other victims of Nazi crimes (referred to,
when taken together, as the ‘Italian victims’) who have yet to obtain any reparation,2
what would this fund look like? This chapter’s analysis takes for granted some of the
conclusions and findings explored more fully in the other chapters in this volume. It
therefore does not seek to determine whether the two states—as a matter of law,
comity or pragmatism—must, should, or even could3 accept the establishment of a
joint fund.4 The working assumption here is that there nevertheless exists the
political will to make such a choice.5 Arguably, this resolution would constitute an
elegant way to cut the Gordian knot of the immunity deadlock and grant overdue
reparation to the victims. It might also be that the operation of such a fund could
suffice for the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) to revise its stance on the granting
of immunity to Germany in civil proceedings before Italian courts. This prospect
remains subject to speculation, and is more fully explored by Paolo Palchetti and
Riccardo Pavoni in their respective chapters.6 Furthermore, this chapter will also not
1Words matter, and in this case the reference to reparation rather than compensation might be
appropriate, both to second Germany’s inclination to consider any payment made as a matter of
comity rather than obligation, and to account for the lump-sum nature of any potential payment
(as opposed to payments measured upon the actual extent of damage suffered by each victim). A
similar switch is discernible, for instance, in the formulation of the Australian Defence Abuse
Response Taskforce (DART) scheme, which was envisioned as a compensation scheme but ended
up being officially labelled as a reparation scheme. See, for more details, Simone Degeling/Kit
Barker, ‘Private Law and Grave Historical Injustice: The Role of the Common Law’, Monash
University Law Review 41 (2015), 377-413, at 380 et seq, in particular note 9.
2Alongside IMIs, who are the majority of potential applicants, other groups could be covered by the
compensation scheme, including civilians subjected to forced labour and victims of mass killings.
3On the legal regime on the granting of compensation under German law, see Andreas von Arnauld,
‘Damages for the Infringement of Human Rights in Germany’, in Ewa Bagińska (ed), Damages for
Violations of Human Rights (Heidelberg: Springer 2016), 101-136.
4In short, whether Germany owes such reparation as a matter of law is disputed. The ICJ decided
not to admit Italy’s counterclaim in the Jurisdictional Immunities dispute and, therefore, has not
addressed the issue. Germany claims that compensation for the IMIs was already included in the
sums paid under the bilateral treaty of 2 June 1961.
5On the political opportunity of reparation movements, and how it affects their rate of success, see
Stephanie Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies (Heidelberg: Springer 2014), 11-12.
6See Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume, who notes that ‘[t]here are
sound reasons for believing that the setting up of a meaningful compensatory procedure would lead
to the suspension or termination of the remaining cases pending against Germany before Italian
courts’, at 94. On this point, see also Paolo Palchetti, ‘Italian Concerns after Sentenza 238/2014:
Possible Reactions, Possible Solutions’, VerfBlog, (11 May 2017), available at https://
verfassungsblog.de/italian-concerns-after-sentenza-2382014-possible-reactions-possible-solutions/
: ‘[A] political initiative involving Germany and Italy and aimed at establishing a mechanism for
addressing the reparation claims of the victims might be regarded by the Constitutional Court as an
adequate alternative route for providing protection to the rights of the victims, thereby justifying a
limitation to the right of access to court and the recognition of Germany’s immunity’. In the chapter
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address the chronological conundrum regarding the victims’ characterization under
international humanitarian law.7 Instead, it will be assumed that, under the prevailing
approach, Italian victims should receive some reparation irrespective of the legal
characterization of Germany’s conduct at that time.
In light of these assumptions, the narrow focus of this chapter will be on certain
practical features and arrangements of the possible joint scheme to come (the ‘Joint
Scheme’). Selected matters will be addressed, such as the funding of the Joint
Scheme, procedures for the distribution of compensation (including the criteria of
eligibility and the appointment of a competent authority for the review of individual
applications), and the waiver of judicial claims.
An attempt is made to draw on extant schemes without presuming any significant
similarity between them. Quite simply, the idea is to look at existing solutions and
provide the architects of the Joint Scheme with a range of options that could be
utilised alongside a handful of warnings. As this chapter ends the substantive section
of this volume, it marks an opportune moment to point the way (or ways) ahead for
the Italian and German authorities.
Sections II and III concern two domestic schemes implemented by Germany and
Australia respectively. Section IV addresses selected payment schemes established
at the interstate level. Section V concludes the chapter by drawing the threads
together and sketching some features of the Joint Scheme. Although section V
provides a distilled checklist, the intermediate sections account for its composition.
This chapter’s intention is to identify some valid principles that could inform the
Joint Scheme’s construction and compose a roadmap. Ultimately, however, the
conviction is that a Joint Scheme for reparations, whatever its make-up, is preferable
to none. This chapter builds on both these intuitions, which Adrian Vermeule
effectively juxtaposed when concluding upon the desirability of less-than-perfect
reparation schemes:
Viewed in the concrete, both transitional and nontransitional programs or awards of com-
pensation are often disastrously unprincipled. We must step back a mile or three, to reflect
that in many cases the only other option not ruled out by political constraints—doing nothing
at all—would be even worse.8
A Joint Scheme would be, therefore, a vessel of ‘rough justice’, a device
preferable to inaction albeit inevitably flawed under the prevailing standards of
‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, of this volume, Palchetti reiterates the underlying
question: ‘It is not clear (. . .) whether an interstate agreement on compensation might be regarded
by the ItCC as an adequate alternative route for providing protection to the rights of the victims,
thereby justifying a limitation to the right of access to court and the recognition of Germany’s
immunity’, at 50. This question raises the issue of Italian constitutional law, which exceeds the
scope of this chapter.
7Their status as victims of war crimes was recognized after the conduct took place, in the III and IV
Geneva Conventions of 1949. See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in
this volume.
8Adrian Vermeule, ‘Reparations as Rough Justice’, University of Chicago Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper 105 (2005), 1-18, at 15.
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justice.9 While roughness is both inevitable and acceptable, the Joint Scheme should
not be unprincipled. This chapter gathers, and expatiates on, the appropriate princi-
ples. While designed to address the unresolved status of IMIs, this chapter could as
well work as blueprint for any mechanism of financial reparations in the wake of
historical injustice, mutatis mutandis.
In particular, the Decalogue-redolent list of section V does not lay the ground
rules for a reparation scheme (for IMIs), but for any reparation scheme.
II. Next of Kin: The RRF Foundation
A useful template to shape the Joint Scheme is the law establishing the Foundation
‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und
Zukunft) (RRF).10 Germany entrusted the RRF with the payment of compensation
to applicants who were victims of forced labour and other ‘injustices’ perpetrated by
the Nazi regime.11 IMIs were unable to obtain compensation under this law, which
expressly excluded prisoners of war from its application.12 Other victims of Nazi
crimes, including the victims of mass killings, were altogether outside the scheme’s
reach. The point here is not to question the Foundation’s decision to reject the IMIs’
applications or the scope of application of the RRF but rather to consider the
functioning of the compensation system established under the RRF Law. It is quite
detailed and might serve as a model for the Joint Scheme’s machinery.
The financing for the RRF fund was provided by the German federal government
and a consortium of German companies.13 The government and German industry
each made a one-off contribution to the RRF fund of DM (Deutsche Mark) five
9Ibid, describing rough justice as ‘the intuition that sometimes it is permissible, even mandatory, to
enact a scheme of compensatory reparations that is indefensible according to any first-best criterion
of justice. Rough justice is indefensible; it seems attractive only when compared to no justice–when
it is recognized that the status quo of inaction is also a proposal, one that may fare even worse,
according to the same criteria that would condemn the relevant reparations proposals’.
10German Law Instituting the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft) of 2 August 2000, Bundesgesetzblatt I 11 August 2000, 1263. For a
commentary, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘Compensation for Forced Labour in World War II: The
German Compensation Law of 2 August 2000’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
3 (2005), 243-252. See also Peer Zumbansen (ed), Zwangsarbeit im Dritten Reich: Erinnerung
und Verantwortung—NS-Forced Labor: Remembrance and Responsibility (Baden Baden: Nomos
2002).
11RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 2, para 1.
12Ibid, Art 11, para 3. On the application of this carve-out, see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012,
99, para 26. The commentary to the law specified that ‘the rules of international law allowed a
detaining power to enlist prisoners of war as workers’.
13RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 3, para 1.
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billion.14 A board of trustees, composed of 27 members, obtained responsibility for
its management. These included, besides a number of German officials, one repre-
sentative for each country, ethnic or national group amongst the prospective appli-
cants (namely Israel, the US, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic,
Roma and Sinti, and Jews) and other institutional members (from the UN and other
international institutions).15
The Foundation did not directly carry out the distribution of compensation. The
funds were made available to a series of non-profit ‘partner organizations’, each
responsible for receiving claims from a specific group of applicants. These organi-
zations were tasked with the liquidation of successful claims16 and with the estab-
lishment of an appeal process for the review of first instance determinations.17
Specific provisions required payments to be suspended or only partially made
until the exhaustion of applications, in order to prevent the Fund from depleting its
resources and becoming insolvent, thus failing to satisfy all eligible applications
after paying out early processed claims.18 For instance, the maximum payable
amount to each applicant eligible as ‘slave labourer’ was set initially at 50% of the
amount owed. The outstanding portion was paid out ‘after conclusion of the
processing of all applications pending before the respective partner organization,
to the extent possible within the framework of the available means.’19
The RRF Law contained a specific provision detailing the eligibility of applicants
for compensation.20 It covered persons subjected by German authorities or commer-
cial companies to forced labour, and subjected to detention or harsh living condi-
tions.21 It also stipulated the possibility of compensating property losses if
the applicants had been unable to seek compensation under previous schemes.22
The burden of demonstrating eligibility lay primarily with the applicants, although
the competent partner organization would normally provide and consider available
14Ibid, Art 3, paras 2 and 3. The current value of this 2001 donation, adjusted for inflation, would be




18Ibid, Art 9, paras 9-10.
19Ibid, para 9. The clause also requires that 5% of the monies allocated be set aside as a financial
reserve for appeals, and that the second round of payments be made only after such reserve has been
set up.
20Ibid, Art 11. In other words, the Law made hardship a necessary requirement for compensation
alongside that of forced labour. See Fassbender, ‘Compensation’ 2005 (n 10), 249: ‘Parliament’s
attention focused on persons detained in concentration camps on the one hand and deportees on the
other–and not on forced labourers as such.’
21RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 11, para 1, numbers 1 and 2.
22Ibid, Art 11, para 1, number 3. Liquidation of these claims was only residually possible, that is,
‘only after all applications pending before the competent commission have been processed’.
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aggregate information to complement the evidence provided by the individuals.23
The competent organization was authorized to accept, on a case-by-case basis,
applications deprived of supporting documentation. For the most part, claims were
strictly personal and, if the application related to the loss of property, heirs could
bring it only if the victims had died after February 1999.24
As for the amount of compensation granted to successful applicants, the RRF
Law set a cap of DM15,000 (approximately €7,600) for internees in concentration
camps (‘slave labourers’)25 and DM5,000 (approximately €2,530) for applicants
who, outside of concentration camps, were subjected to other forms of harsh
treatment, confinement and detention (‘forced labourers’).26 A total of DM8.1 billion
was ear-marked for compensating slave (and forced) labour, with DM50 million and
DM1 billion budgeted, respectively, to compensate other personal injuries and
property losses.27 DM700 million were instead reserved for separate projects of
the Foundation other than compensation.28
The transfer of funds awarded under the compensation scheme was conditional
on a previous declaration of ‘legal peace’made by the German parliament, certifying
the dismissal of all lawsuits pending abroad.29 The Law also prescribed that com-
pensation claims could only be brought under the procedures established thereunder,
to the exclusion of all other claims.30 Applicants would waive all other avenues of
redress, and the waiver would take effect at the moment of payment.31 To endorse
the unilateral preclusion of other claims effected by Germany, the US government
issued a statement of interest in every dispute brought before US courts—effectively
validating the choice of forum made in the Law and requesting that the individual
claim be redirected to the RRF.32
To ascertain the viability of adopting similar solutions in a Joint Scheme, a few
essential traits of this compensation scheme should be isolated. Some elements seem
23Ibid, Art 11, para 2: ‘Eligibility shall be demonstrated by the applicant by submission of
documentation. The partner organization shall bring in relevant evidence. If no relevant evidence
is available, the claimant’s eligibility can be made credible in some other way.’
24Ibid, Art 13, para 1.
25This terminology is employed in Libby Adler and Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Forgetfulness of
Noblesse: A Critique of the German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers
of the Third Reich’, Harvard Journal on Legislation 39 (2002), 1-62, at 2.
26RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 9, para 1.
27Ibid, Art 9, paras 2-4.
28Ibid, Art 9, para 7. The Foundation has carried out several ‘Funding Activities’, especially in the
field of historiography and the remembrance of victims, through the building of an online database,
the organization of encounters with former forced labourers and other victims, the funding of
educational projects, etc. See ‘Funding Programmes of the Foundation EVZ’, available at www.
stiftung-evz.de/eng/funding/.
29RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 17, para 2.
30Ibid, Art 16.
31Ibid, Art 2.
32See Adler and Zumbansen, ‘The Forgetfulness’ 2002 (n 25), 4.
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fit for transplant: the quid pro quo nature (dismissal and waiver of lawsuits in
exchange for compensation), the administrative process of claims liquidation, the
intentional ambiguity regarding the legal basis for addressing injustices, entrusting
the governance of payment processes to non-profit organizations, the flexible evi-
dentiary principles, and the prescription of a possibility to challenge liquidation
decisions and obtain their review.
Other elements of the RRF scheme appear less appropriate. The non-eligibility of
heirs would frustrate the effectiveness of the Joint Scheme, given the timeframe of
the crimes for which reparation is due. Some commentators criticized the Law for
showing, on the part of Germany, ‘no remorse, no confession, and no sense of debt
for the merciless treatment’ of the victims.33 The quantification of compensation
caps is also an obviously delicate matter. Forced labourers employed outside con-
centration camps (non-slave labourers) received a sum that could be considered low
against several plausible baselines (for instance, the DM5,000 cap meant, for most
applicants, that the amount awarded was lower than what they would have received
had they been paid the minimum wage for the labour service supplied at that time).
III. DART: The Australian Solution
Since 2011, Australia has been coping with a barrage of individual complaints
relating to sexual and other forms of abuse allegedly perpetrated by personnel of
the Australian Defence Force.34 After evidence emerged of systemic problems, the
government established the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce (DART), which
was to assess individual complaints and determine the appropriate response
thereto.35
A range of possible responses were offered, including restorative justice/confer-
encing processes, counselling, compensation capped at A$ (Australian Dollars)
50,000,36 and the referral of matters to criminal prosecution and/or the military
33Ibid, 5-6.
34The cut-off date for the alleged actions was 11 April 2011, when the law firm DLA Piper, upon the
government’s commission, completed an investigation into the matter, see Garry A Rumble/
Melanie McKean/Dennis Pearce, Report of the Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse
in Defence: Facing the Problems of the Past, Volume—General Findings and Recommendations
(Canberra: DLA Piper 2011).
35For a positive assessment of DART, see Alikki Vernon, ‘The Ethics of Appropriate Justice
Approaches: Lessons from a Restorative Response to Institutional Abuse’, Law in Context
35 (2017), 139-158.
36Approximately €32,700 at the rate prevailing at the time of writing.
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justice system.37 Nearly all applicants requested monetary reparation.38 The focus of
this study will only be on the monetary reparation system. Nonetheless, the scheme
was remarkable for providing a diverse set of remedies. In particular, the DART
process acknowledged the need for victims to have their complaints heard and their
grievances accepted by the Australian Defence Force, while also devising a specific
engagement procedure to that effect.39
It is important to note that although DLA Piper (the law firm tasked with carrying
out the initial investigation) recommended establishing a ‘compensation’ plan and
the ministry initially agreed, the resulting plan was re-branded as a ‘reparation’
scheme. As it is expressly stated in the reparation guidelines, payments made should
not be understood to represent compensation, nor to imply an assumption of state
liability.40 Moreover, participation in the reparation scheme does not foreclose the
right to resort to domestic courts. Tribunals are merely reminded to take into account
the amount of reparation granted under the DART scheme to liquidate damages in
tort or statute.41
The DART reparation scheme was handled as a purely administrative process.42
Eligible applicants were all persons who were employed in the Australian Defence
Force and alleged to have suffered abuse effected by Defence Force personnel,
subject to certain deadlines for the presentation of the complaint.43 Applications
consisted of a reparation form, a personal account of the alleged abuse (and any
related follow-up procedure exhausted within the Defence Force), and proof of
37See Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, ‘Report of the
DLA Piper Review and the Government’s Response’, (27 June 2013), available at https://www.aph.
gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Com
pleted_inquiries/2010-13/dlapiper/report/index, para 2.50, referring to an action plan announced on
26 November 2012 by the Minister for Defence, the Honourable Stephen Smith MP, in response to
the DLA report.
38The breakdown of remedies granted is as follows (out of 1,751 processed complaints):
‘[A] reparation payment (1,723 complainants at a total cost of US$66.63 million); counselling
(577 complainants); participation in the Restorative Engagement Program (715 complainants);
referral to police for possible criminal investigation and prosecution (133 complainants); and
referral to the Chief of the Defence Force for consideration of possible administrative or disciplinary
action (132 complainants)’. See Australian government, ‘Defence Abuse Response Taskforce Final
Report’, (31 March 2016), available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51343294.pdf, 11.
39Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 146, records the motivation of establishing the so-called
Restorative Engagement Conferences: ‘The consistent request from complainants was to: have
their personal account of abuse listened to by Defence; have their personal account accepted as true;
be given acknowledgement that the abuse was wrong and should not have happened’.
40Australian government, ‘Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme Guidelines’, available at www.aph.
gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id¼7d8a8c38-f721-42cf-baed-3538593a3ee4, para 1.6.1: ‘A payment
to a person under the Reparation Scheme is not paid as compensation or damages for any asserted,
perceived, or possible legal liability on the part of the Commonwealth, or for any injury, disease or
impairment, and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the Commonwealth.’
41Ibid, para 1.6.2.
42Ibid, para 2.1.6: ‘[H]earings, negotiations or appeals’ were not envisaged for its functioning.
43Ibid, para 3.1.4.
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identity. Reparation was not available for applications made regarding deceased
persons.44
The evidentiary standard required of applicants is worth careful analysis. The
individual account of the abuse is expressly presumed to correspond to the ‘person’s
personal experience of alleged abuse’ unless evidence emerges to contradict it.45
Additional information might be sought from either the applicant or the Defence
Force. The Defence Force’s failure to submit documents requested by the taskforce
would result in a presumption that the Defence Force is unable to contradict the
information provided by the applicant,46 though it would ultimately be for the
competent assessor47 to form an opinion on the merits as to the ‘plausibility’ of
the applicant’s allegations.48 There is no classic treatment of the burden and standard
of proof, nor is there a precise system of reversals; the assessor’s opinion, based on
any available evidence, is the controlling criterion of any payment determination. In
the words of the assessor:
The plausibility test was also pivotal in humanely considering complaints from many
individuals who were aged, frail or in a vulnerable state of health or wellbeing or otherwise
reluctant or unable to recount often very traumatic instances of abuse.49
DART-awarded reparations were classified in pre-fixed amounts corresponding
to the varying gravity of the alleged abuse.50
The DART scheme, insofar as it did not preclude the victims’ access to judicial
redress, is not a pertinent model for the Joint Scheme because it did not ensure legal




47The Reparation Payment Assessor was appointed by the Minister of Defence to review abuse
applications and determine whether a payment would be made, and the amount thereof. The
designated assessor was Robyn Kruk, a retired senior Australian public servant.
48Ibid, para 4.5.1: The plausibility standard entailed that individual applications were upheld when
the allegations had ‘the appearance of reasonableness’; see Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 146.
49Australian government, ‘DART Final Report’ 2016 (n 38), 62, Appendix I—Comments by the
Reparation Payments Assessor.
50Categories 1 to 4 attract, respectively, a payment of A$5,000 (approx. €3,200); A$15,000
(approx. €9,600); A$30,000 (approx. €19,200); A$45,000 (approx. €28,800); see Australian
government, Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme Guidelines (n 40), para 4.6.1. More than half of
the applicants received payments relating to the most serious category of abuse. The types of abuses
are reported in Annex 10 to the DLA Piper Report and are further grouped to facilitate the task of the
taskforce into four genres (sexual abuse, sexual harassment, physical abuse, and harassment and
bullying). Somewhat counter-intuitively, the four categories used for reparation purposes have little
descriptive value and do not correspond to the type of abuse, but they are supposed to correspond to
different degrees of gravity. As explained by the taskforce: ‘A single incident of physical assault
with no serious injury might fall in Category 1 or 2 (depending on the individual circumstances),
while a serious sexual assault, such as a rape, would be expected to fall within Category 4.’ See
DART taskforce, ‘Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence’,
(September 2014), 19.
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of pre-fixed reparation amounts relating to certain recurring abuses and the use of a
flexible standard of evidence are two solutions that might fit well with the operation
of a Joint Scheme.
IV. Other Compensation Schemes
1. Eritrea/Ethiopia
Within the regime of the Algiers Agreement, which put an end to the border war
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the parties provided for the establishment of an
independent Claims Commission. Such a Commission was competent to decide
through arbitration the claims brought by either state party, including claims made
on behalf of individual citizens.51 The Commission’s jurisdiction extended, inter
alia, on claims for damages relating to breaches of international humanitarian law
committed during the conflict by either party.52 The Commission was entitled to
draft its own rules of procedure.53
Insofar as the Commission functioned as an arbitral tribunal, it does not seem to
provide an adequate model for the Joint Scheme. The great advantage of the Joint
Scheme would be that Germany does not object to the assumption of responsibility
for the injustices perpetrated against IMIs. A review of compensation claims under
the Joint Scheme would not implicate or require a determination of state responsi-
bility for breaches of ius in bello or ad bellum—a determination that the
51Note that individuals were not afforded access to arbitration, which remained an interstate
affair only.
52Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation
and peacebuilding in both countries (Algiers Agreement), 12 December 2000, 2138 UNTS 93, Art
5.1: ‘1. Consistent with the Framework Agreement, in which the parties commit themselves to
addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population including the
impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral Claims Commission shall be
established. The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims
for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both
natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of the other party or entities
owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of the
Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law. The Commission shall not hear claims
arising from the cost of military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of force,
except to the extent that such claims involve violations of international humanitarian law.’
53Which are available at the dedicated website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; see Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission, ‘Rules of Procedure’, available at https://pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/774.
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Commission, controversially enough, resolved to make.54 The Eritrea/Ethiopia
experience, in other words, is mostly instructive a contrario. The Joint Scheme
should not hinge itself on the ascertainment of Germany’s responsibility through
judicial or arbitral proceedings but only on the administrative review of the
pre-determined eligibility criteria of the applicants and their claims.
In one respect, however, the experience of the Claims Commission can be
relevant. The Commission established, alongside single claims warranting ad hoc
scrutiny on the merits, certain categories of claims for which a mass-claim procedure
would be used instead. Applicants whose claims were aggregate into mass claims
would be entitled to a fixed amount of compensation.55 In essence, once state
responsibility for a certain breach of international law is determined, a random
sample of individual claims hinging on the invocation of that breach would proceed
to a review on the merits. Through this exercise, the Commission would determine
(within the sample) the percentage of claims supported by adequate evidence. It
would then order compensation to all claimants in the class, reduced in amount to
match that percentage.56 For instance, if only 50% of claims in the sample are
meritorious, each claimant in that class would receive half of the
compensation owed.
Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea used this mass-claim mechanism, a choice that
revealed the limits of subjecting individual claims to state espousal and the con-
straints imposed by a severe deadline.57 The state parties opted for a fast-track
process with a predetermined conclusion date: they allowed 3 years for the exhaus-
tion of all arbitration proceedings, and consequently envisaged a tight 1-year dead-
line to present the claims. These time constraints certainly had a chilling effect on the
possibility to orchestrate mass claims.58
54Christine Gray, ‘The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A Partial
Award?’, European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), 699-721.
55Claims Commission, ‘Rules of Procedure’ (n 53), Art 30. The sub-categories refer to unlawful
displacement, unlawful expulsion, unlawful treatment of prisoners of war, unlawful detention and
other instances of loss, damage and injuries.
56Ibid, Art 32.3: ‘If the Commission makes all of the determinations in paragraph 1, the claims in
that sub-category for each of the two levels of compensation shall be subject to random sampling of
their evidence to ascertain the percentage of such claims for which the evidence is inadequate to
establish the claim. The compensation for all claims in that compensation level of that sub-category
is automatically reduced by that percentage, and the Commission shall issue an award of such
compensation for all claims in that sub-category.’
57See Ari Dybnis, ‘Was the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a Zero-Sum Game:
Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational Conflict’, Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 33 (2010), 255-286, at 268: ‘[D]espite the
availability of this mass claims option, the parties chose only to file government-to-government
claims, with the exception of six claims which Eritrea filed on behalf of six individuals whom
Ethiopia had expelled.’
58Ibid, ‘[i]f not for this deadline, then the parties might have considered collecting individuals’
claims and utilizing the mass claims procedure’.
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The automatic reduction in the compensation paid to the individual applicants,
commensurate with the percentage of unmeritorious claims in the sample, would
likely have encouraged the states to exercise diligence in the collection and presen-
tation of claims. A similar mechanism would be inherently unfair in a system where
individuals can present the applications in their own name, a model that is most
appropriate for a potential Joint Scheme. To the contrary, the adoption of a sample
review might be an efficient solution, especially if applications share a common
factual matrix and certain gateway issues are positively established for each claim
(the identity of the claimant or the plausibility of their involvement in the chrono-
logical and geographical scenario of the injustice).
2. Iraq/Kuwait Reparations
After the end of the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the UN Security Council issued
Resolution 687 in which it reaffirmed Iraq’s liability for all damages caused by the
unlawful occupation of Kuwait.59 It also called for the creation of a fund and a
commission for the compensation of claims relating to such liability, including those
brought by individuals.60 The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)
was thus created.61 Some of its operational features are of interest to our current
purposes.
In particular, the UNCC had jurisdiction over an enormous number of individual
claims for damages up to US$100,000 (‘C’ claims, referring to its dedicated cate-
gory). It noted in its first decision that ‘[t]he complexities associated with the
processing of “C” claims, requiring the resolution of myriad legal, factual, eviden-
tiary and valuation issues, are compounded by the massive number of claims in this
category—in excess of 415,000’.62 Since these complexities are, in part, comparable
to those with which a Joint Scheme might have to cope, if the eligibility criteria are
wide enough, it is helpful therefore to observe the solutions adopted by the UNCC.
The UNCC started from an assumption of Iraq’s responsibility, and
circumscribed its review to the issue of causality and quantum.63 With a view to
process all ‘C’ claims in an expedited way, the rules provided for the possibility to
resort to a sample analysis of the merits of the individual claims.64 The Panel of
59UN Security Council, Resolution 687, S/RES/687, 3 April 1991, para 16.
60Ibid, paras 18 and 19.
61For more information see United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC); see www.uncc.
ch/.
62UNCC, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First
Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages up to US$100,000 (Category ‘C’ Claims), S/AC.26/
1994/3, 21 December 1994, 6.
63Ibid, 9.
64Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, S/AC.26/1992/10, 26 June 1992, Art 37(b): ‘With
respect to claims that cannot be completely verified through the computerized database, if the
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Commissioners, moreover, made its recommendations based on the documents
submitted.65 This approach suggested the possibility that full evidence would not
be required for every claim; indeed, the applicable rule suggests that ‘C claims’must
satisfy a relatively low evidentiary threshold, and that the smaller claims among
them might be treated even more leniently:
With respect to “C” claims, Article 35(c) of the Rules provides that the claims must be
documented by appropriate evidence of the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss.
Documents and other evidence required will be the reasonable minimum that is appropriate
under the particular circumstances of the case. A lesser degree of documentary evidence
ordinarily will be sufficient for smaller claims such as those below US$20,000.66
The Panel of Commissioners, explaining what documents might suffice to
achieve a ‘reasonable minimum’ of evidence, stressed the importance of the claim
form—corroborated by the self-declaration of veracity of the applicant and the
sanctions that domestic law attaches to false statements. Alongside the claim form,
the Panel considered identification documents, personal and witness statements, and
other documents that could be probative of the loss claimed.
The Panel, called to consider the ‘particular circumstances of the case’, in
determining the standard of proof required, noted all the reasons, in the circum-
stances of the invasion, why the applicants might not have been able to withhold,
conserve and present fuller evidence in support of their claims.67 It was also noted
that the scarcity of evidence in support of mass claims ‘is not a phenomenon without
precedent’ in international practice. Therefore, the upholding of claims that, taken
individually, present less than optimal evidentiary support is acceptable, owing to
the circumstances in which the applicants had to gather the evidence and the nature
of the UNCC’s mandate.68
This is a lesson that might apply all the more plausibly to a hypothetical Joint
Scheme, given that the general elements of the injustices attributed to Germany are
known and that the applicants would probably not seek precise amounts of com-
pensation relating to material losses. A Joint Scheme might be spared the difficult
volume of claims is large, the Panel may check individual claims on the basis of a sampling with
further verification only as circumstances warrant.’
65Ibid, Art 37(c).
66Ibid, Art 35(c), reproduced in UNCC, Report, 1994 (n 62), 22 (emphases added).
67Ibid, 26.
68Ibid, 29. The panel also recalled the remark made in the Study Concerning the Right to
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, presented by Theo van Boven, the Special Rapporteur appointed by
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN
Commission on Human Rights (UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July
1993, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/demo/van%20Boven_1993.pdf. In particular, para
137 of the Study states that ‘[a]dministrative or judicial tribunals responsible for affording repara-
tions should take into account that records or other tangible evidence may be limited or unavailable.
In the absence of other evidence, reparations should be based on the testimony of victims, family
members, medical and mental health professionals.’
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determination of causation and quantum that complicated the task of the UNCC. A
system based on eligibility through status (eg, the applicant’s condition as IMI, or
heir of a victim of mass killings) and pre-fixed compensation amounts would render
the review of applications significantly easier.
3. Comfort Women
In December 2015, Japan and South Korea reached an agreement aimed ostensibly
at resolving interstate tensions with regard to Japan’s practice of enforced prostitu-
tion during World War II (the so-called ‘comfort women’ phenomenon).69 The issue
of ‘comfort women’ has plagued relations between the two states for decades,70
along with several other historical disputes,71 in part due to Japan’s unflinching
stance.
Japan, indeed, has openly accepted only its ‘moral responsibilities’,72 and tried to
assuage the victims through monetary contributions ex gratia channelled through a
newly established Asian Women’s Fund (AWF). Such emoluments have not always
been so well received; NGOs urged victims to boycott the AWF73 and many
survivors refused to accede the payments, noting Japan’s refusal to own up to its
historical responsibility and provide full reparation.74 In short:
The women who would become military sex slaves have uniformly indicated that they are
unsatisfied with Japan’s engagement with the comfort women issue. This has been largely due
to the lack of an apologetic stance by Japan. The consistent denial, acknowledgment, and then
blaming the victims for the injustices experienced, has lent credence to the viewpoint that the
Japanese government is insincere in its efforts to come to terms with the past.75
69See a recent account of the controversy in Torsten Weber, ‘Apology Failures: Japan’s Strategies
Towards China and Korea in Dealing with Its Imperialist Past’, in Berber Bevernage/Nico Wouters
(eds), The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History After 1945 (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan 2018), 801–816, at 804 et seq.
70See, for instance, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and Mass
Violence’, in Eric Stover/Harvey M Weinstein (eds), My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: CUP 2010), 121-140, at 128-129;
Cheah Wui Ling, ‘Walking the Long Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case Study of the Comfort
Women Movement’s Deployment of Human Rights Discourse’, Harvard Human Rights Journal
22 (2009), 63-107.
71Spanning across trade disputes, territorial disputes, disputes on the reparations for World War II
forced labourers.
72Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Letter to the Former Comfort Women, [exact day
unspecified] 2001, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter.html.
73Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations 2014 (n 5), 275.
74Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP 2005),
437 (recounting also Japan’s initiative in 1995 to establish an Asian Women’s Fund, financed by
private donations, which made approximately US$19,000 available to each comfort woman).
75Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations 2014 (n 5), 276.
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Alongside an overdue acknowledgement of generic ‘responsibilities’,76 and
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s conveyance of ‘his most sincere apologies
and remorse’,77 the 2015 agreement contemplated a Japanese contribution of a
modest sum (approximately US$8.8 million) towards the establishment of a Korean
foundation supporting former comfort women. The Foundation for Reconciliation
and Healing was effectively created in July 2016 and received the promised amount
by the Japanese government. The Korean government looked after the payment of
approximately US$18,000 to the families of deceased comfort women and US
$90,000 to those still alive.78 It might be worth noticing that, out of an estimated
80,000 to 200,000 victims, only 238 Korean women have come forward to register
with the scheme, of whom just 46 were alive at the time of the 2015 agreement,79
37 in July 2017,80 31 in January 2018,81 27 in November 2018,82 22 in March
2019,83 19 in January 2020, and 17 in August 2020.84
In spite of the payments, the deal attracted criticism in South Korea. It was widely
perceived as a diplomatic defeat for Korea and as Japan’s successful attempt at
76The wording of the statement is carefully crafted to mention the notion of responsibility without
attaching it to anyone in particular: ‘The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the
Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large
numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this
perspective.’ See the full text of the Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic
of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion of 28 December 2015, available at www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/
page4e_000364.html.
77Ibid, point 1.
78Benjamin Lee, ‘South Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement: Where Do We Go from Here?’,
The Diplomat, (6 September 2016), available at https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/south-korea-
japan-comfort-women-agreement-where-do-we-go-from-here/.
79Benjamin Lee, ‘South Korea, Japan Agree to Irreversibly End “Comfort Women” Row’,
The Diplomat, (28 December 2015), available at www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-
southkoreacomfortwomen/south-korea-japan-agree-to-irreversibly-end-comfort-women-
rowidUSKBN0UB0EC20151228.
80‘Head of South Korean “Comfort Women” Foundation Resigns; Survivor Who Testified in
U.S. Dies’, The Japan Times, (23 July 2017), available at www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/
23/national/politics-diplomacy/head-south-korean-foundation-comfort-women-steps/#.
WhoBQkqnHIU.
81Hyonhee Shin, ‘Japan Rejects South Korean Call for Extra Steps over “Comfort Women”’,
Reuters, (9 January 2018), available at www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-japan-comfortwomen/
japan-rejects-south-korean-call-for-extra-steps-over-comfort-women-idUSKBN1EY0F6.
82‘South Korea Says It Will Dissolve Japan-funded “Comfort Women” Foundation’, The Japan
Times, (21 November 2018), available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/21/national/
politics-diplomacy/south-korea-says-will-dissolve-japan-funded-comfort-women-foundation.
83‘Another Comfort Woman Survivor Passes Away without Apology from Japanese Government’,
Hankyoreh, (4 March 2019), available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_interna
tional/884479.html.
84‘Another Korean sexual slavery victim dies, number of survivors at 19’, The Korea Herald,
(23 January 2020), available at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud¼20200123000650&
ACE_SEARCH¼1; ‘Commemorative ceremony marking Int’l Memorial Day for Comfort Women
to be held in Cheonan’, Arirang, (14 August 2020), available at http://www.arirang.com/News/
News_View.asp?sys_lang¼Eng&nseq¼263353.
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resolving ‘finally and irreversibly’ the row with South Korea without trying to
meaningfully engage either with the victims or with its own responsibility.85 The
deal came under severe scrutiny and the newly incumbent Korean government
announced that it would revise its terms, causing the head of AWF to resign.86
The impression that the agreement did not take into account the voice of the victims
has been compounded by Japan’s attempts at silencing protests and condemning the
erection of memorials. These actions are perceived as furthering an intention to erase
the memory of the victims and, as a consequence, the country’s full assumption of
past responsibility.87 Japan’s refusal to issue a letter of apology after the 2015
agreement and South Korea’s refusal to remove statues paying tribute to comfort
women installed in the vicinity of Japanese embassies paved the way for the current
renewal of diplomatic tensions.88
In late 2017, the Korean minister of foreign affairs requested a revision of the
agreement, but his Japanese counterpart, hinting at its interstate nature, refused to
re-open the deal:89
The Japan–South Korea agreement is an agreement between the two governments and one
that has been highly appreciated by international society (...). If the South Korean govern-
ment (...) tried to revise the agreement that is already being implemented, that would make
Japan’s ties with South Korea unmanageable and it would be unacceptable.90
85The ambiguity of monetary payments in restorative efforts—especially when compensation is
inherently incommensurable with the harm suffered and is inevitably low—is a known phenome-
non. See Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 10: ‘Offering an apology for some wrong one has
committed would usually become a more offensive gesture, rather than a more credible expression
of remorse, were a $100 bill to be thrown in—although this may be a strictly interpersonal point that
does not hold for government payments.’ The South Korean case shows that the point can hold, at
least in certain circumstances, also in respect of government payments, although the interstate
dimension and the memory of war scenarios might exacerbate the problem. Wolfe, The Politics of
Reparations 2014 (n 5), 274, remarked on the dichotomy between the domestic and the interna-
tional take on the atrocities committed by Japan. In spite of the reparation scheme established, the
prevailing view in Japan has remained one of denial: ‘[T]he tension between the international
memory and the domestic memory indicates that acceptance is still contentious within Japan.’
86See Lee, ‘South Korea, Japan Agree’ 2017 (n 79).
87See, for instance, the letter sent on 1 February 2017 by the Mayor of Osaka to the Mayor of San
Francisco to protest the instalment of a Comfort Women Memorial. This action is described as
being ‘adverse to the spirit of the agreement [with South Korea]’, available, in full, at https://ww2.
kqed.org/arts/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/09/Ltr-of-Osaka-mayor-opposing-CWM-2-1-2017.
pdf.
88Ilaria Maria Sala, ‘Why Is the Plight of “Comfort Women” Still So Controversial?’, The New York
Times, (14 August 2017), available at www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/comfort-women-
japan-south-korea.html.
89Annemarie Luck, ‘No Comfort in the Truth: It’s the Episode of History Japan Would Rather
Forget. Instead Comfort Women Are Back in the News’, Index on Censorship 47(1) (2018), 19-21.
90‘Japan Says Revising Comfort Women Agreement with South Korea Unacceptable’, Reuters,




Korea back-pedalled somewhat on its threat to denounce the agreement, but
refused to use the funds provided by Japan, opting instead to inject the necessary
funds to replace them from its own budget.91
The 2015 agreement has been ‘effectively abandoned’92 and in December 2019
the Constitutional Court of South Korea has determined that, since it did not
establish clear rights and duties for the two countries, it cannot be set aside for
infringing on the victims’ constitutional rights. In January 2021, a Seoul Central
District Court condemned Japan to pay approximately $92,000 each to the 12
surviving victims.93 The non-agreement remains, and so does the disagreement
between the two countries.
As of early 2021, Japan has not obtained irreversible closure, and the South
Korean government has received criticism from its own citizens for its mishandling
of the negotiation and having to pay its way out of the mess. Furthermore, the
victims have expressed no feeling of satisfaction, and the citizens of both countries
have grown increasingly uneasy about the issue. None of the sought-after goals of
the agreement have materialized. The circumstances evince the faux pas of the
respective state authorities, who have struck a deal without consulting nor paying
meaningful considerations to the victims.94
There are certain obvious differences between the Japan–South Korea tensions
and the prospect of providing reparation to IMIs and other victims. The most evident
is that Japan is hesitant to embrace its full responsibility and actively tries to erase the
memory of the injustices (or at least what it believes to be exaggerated representa-
tions thereof), whereas Germany has unquestionably accepted legal responsibility
for war crimes committed. This crucial difference might contribute to reducing the
risk of a Joint Scheme being rejected by the beneficiaries on the grounds that it
merely represents a buy-out. However, the lesson learnt from the fragile fate of the
91‘South Korea Not Seeking Renegotiation over Comfort Women Deal with Japan’, Reuters,
(9 January 2018): ‘South Korea’s Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said it was “undeniable”
the two governments formally reached the settlement, under which Japan apologised to victims and
provided 1 billion yen ($8.8 million) to a fund to support them. Seoul will set aside its own budget to
bankroll the fund and consult with Tokyo on what to do with the 1 billion yen it had given, she said’,
available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-09/s.korea-not-seeking-to-renegotiate-comfort-
women-deal-with-japan/9315556.
92‘South Korea court upholds Japan ‘comfort women’ deal’, The Straits Times, (28 December
2019), available at https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korea-court-upholds-japan-
comfort-women-deal.
93Seoul Central District Court, Judgment of 8 January 2021, No 2016 Ga-Hap 505092; see Daniel
Franchini, ‘South Korea’s denial of Japan’s immunity for international crimes: Restricting or
bypassing the law of state immunity?’, Voelkerrechtsblog, (18 January 2021), available at https://
voelkerrechtsblog.org/south-koreas-denial-of-japans-immunity-for-international-crimes/
94Weber, ‘Apology Failures’ 2017 (n 69), 804: ‘Instead of offering an “apology” (shazai or owabi
in Japanese), the terms used to convey notions of self-critical reflection were “true regret” (makoto
ni ikan) in the Korean case, as well as “deep remorse” in both the Korean and Chinese cases (. . .).
These phrases were apparently regarded as sufficient by the respective state leaders, who prioritized
receiving Japanese economic assistance over emphasizing Japan’s historical guilt’ [notes omitted].
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2015 agreement is that the two states concerned must involve the victims or their
representatives during the negotiation stage, and make sure that the outcome is at
least reflective of their voices and acknowledges their requests. In this respect, the
mere allocation of monetary awards might fall short of satisfactory reparation if the
victims are cut out of the process. Reparation cannot function independently of
reconciliation, and reconciliation is not solely an interstate matter.
There is, however, a striking similarity between the two scenarios. Given the
shared factual taxonomy of the two underlying injustices (occurring between 80 and
70 years ago), the surviving victims are now few in numbers and are dying at an
accelerating rate. A provision for the compensation of deceased victims’ families, at
a reduced rate, might prove acceptable. Alternatively, the Joint Scheme might
provide for the descendants’ right to seek full compensation on behalf of deceased
IMIs if death occurred after a specific cut-off date, which might very well be set in
the past (eg 2004, the date of the first Ferrini judgment,95 or February 1999, the
cut-off date established in the RRF Law). Safeguards such as these would defuse the
obnoxious result that any delay in fulfilling the moral duty of providing reparation
might directly diminish the burden of its realization, due to the shrinking pool of
beneficiaries.
4. The US/France Agreements on Banks and Railroad
Deportees
a) The 2001 Banks Agreement
In 2001, France and the US stipulated an agreement regarding the restitution of sums
held on bank accounts opened with certain French banks that had been frozen as a
result of anti-Semitic legislation (the Washington Agreement).96 France committed
to obtaining from the banks a US$100 million contribution for a dedicated founda-
tion.97 The banks also committed themselves to pay restitution claims approved by
the Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation (Commission pour
l’indemnisation des victimes de spoliations, or CIVS).98 The US pledged to inform
95Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/04 (Ferrini).
96See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II (the Washington
Agreement), 18 January 2001, 2156 UNTS 281, as amended 30 and 31 May 2002, 21 February
2006 (entered into force 5 February 2001).
97Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah (Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah), created in
France on 26 December 2000.
98For more information see www.civs.gouv.fr/. With decree No 99–778 of 10 September 1999, the
French Government created a Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting
from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force during the Occupation, available at https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte¼LEGITEXT000005628500&dateTexte¼20081229.
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US courts that any claims against the French banks should be dismissed as
contradicting US foreign policy interests,99 effectively designating the CIVS proce-
dure as the preferred avenue for such claims.100
Annex B to the Washington Agreement defined the working procedure of the
CIVS as one of considering the individual claims. Of particular interest is the
indication that ‘[t]he Commission will investigate and consider claims on relaxed
standards of proof. A claimant’s application or a simple inquiry by the claimant to
the existence of a bank asset is sufficient to trigger an investigation’.101 The
operation of this relaxed standard of proof is further explained when the recommen-
dation powers of the Commission are addressed:
Following such an investigation and after communication with the claimant or their repre-
sentative (. . .) if an account can be verified by any means, including because the claim
matches a name or account on a list or other document available to the Commission, the
Commission makes a recommendation on an award together with the reason(s) for that
recommendation (. . .) the Commission will recognize as sufficient evidence to make an
Award any of the following four categories: proof, presumption, indication, and intimate
personal conviction.102
In other words, the Commission procedure hinged on a highly favourable stan-
dard of proof (‘any means’ including a plausible affidavit by the applicant103 could
be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an expropriated account) and a
favourable burden of proof (the evidence might be provided by the CIVS itself
rather than by the applicant). First instance decisions by the CIVS could be
appealed.104
The scheme was strictly restitutory in nature, and the Commission was not
entitled to reduce the amount of compensation for any reason other than double
recovery:105 the balance on the accounts would have to be repaid in full, subject to
certain rounding adjustments. Until 2005, it was also possible to receive compensa-
tion of up to US$3,000 merely on the basis of an affidavit, even if the Commission
was unable to ascertain the existence of the account claimed by the applicant.106
99Washington Agreement, 2001 (n 96), Art 2.
100Consider, however, point 9 of Annex C to the Washington Agreement, which reproduces the
Statement of Interest of the US to be submitted in the domestic proceedings: ‘The United States
does not suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an
independent legal basis for dismissal.’ This language is perhaps obligatory to preserve the separa-
tion of powers between the executive and judicial branches.
101Washington Agreement, 2001 (n 96), Annex B.
102Ibid, principles B and D.
103Ibid, principle F.1. See also Exhibit 2 for a model of the affidavit.
104Ibid, principle K.
105Ibid. The Commission was also prevented from offsetting part of the compensation against other
payments received by the applicants in the form of material or non-material damages.
106An overview of the liquidation principles is available at www.civs.gouv.fr/en/getting-
compensation/specific-provisions-relating-to-bank-related-compensation/; ‘Soft-claims’ (ie, those
deprived of sufficient evidence) would be paid out of a dedicated fund, capped at US$22.5 million.
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Since the claims submitted to the CIVS under the Washington Agreement were
only for restitution, the scheme might be a poor template for any future Joint
Scheme, which would presumably focus on reparation or quasi-compensation.
However, the technical provisions relating to the evidentiary regime used by the
CIVS to review claims are worth taking into account, as they aimed at addressing
evidentiary complications that are similar to those the IMIs and other victims might
encounter.
The imposition of forced labour or the occurrence of mass killings, similar to the
blocking of the French bank accounts, is not a controverted fact; several decades
have passed since the unjust actions occurred and the affected individuals’ age and
personal history might undermine attempts to retrieve a full documentation of the
harms suffered. In this respect, the value of individuals’ affidavits as presumptive
evidence is a possible solution that would respond to the need to afford applicants
with fair treatment in the operation of a Joint Scheme for compensation.
b) The 2014 Railroad Deportees Agreement
In December 2014, the governments of France and the US stipulated an agreement
regarding the treatment of certain holocaust victims—those deported from French
territory who had not been covered by previous reparation schemes.107
The explicit purpose of the agreement and the compensation mechanism
established therein was to achieve ‘legal peace’ with respect to all claims against
France asserted in US courts.108 France pledged US$60 million to a US account,
from which the US government would draw funds to pay individual claimants. In
return, the US would recognize French immunity, terminate legal actions pending in
US courts and ensure that the beneficiaries of the compensation schemes would
execute waivers of further action against France.109 The US and its affiliated
authorities would take full responsibility for the distribution of the funds to the
See, for a discussion of the restitution scheme, Michael J Bazyler, ‘The Holocaust Restitution
Movement in Comparative Perspective’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2002), 11-44, at
18-19.
107See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume. Agreement between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic on
Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-Related Deportation from France Who Are Not
Covered by French Programs (Railroad Deportees Agreement), 8 December 2014, 55 ILM
339 (2016), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/us_france_agreement.
pdf.
108Railroad Deportees Agreement, 2014 (n 107), Art 4.1: ‘The Parties agree that this payment
constitutes the final, comprehensive, and exclusive manner for addressing, between the United
States of America and France, all Holocaust deportation claims not covered by existing compen-
sation programs, which have been or may be asserted against France in the United States of America
or in France.’ See also Art 4.2.
109Ibid, Art 5. An Annex to the Agreement spells out the waivers and relinquishments that all
applicants will be required to sign in order to access the payment.
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victims and establish the appropriate procedure without French input;110 the US
established a Deportation Claims Program that is currently processing claims.111
The programme reaches widely ratione personae. Alongside those individuals
deported from France who remain alive, the programme covers their spouses and
thus envisages two main categories of beneficiaries: survivors and surviving
spouses. Furthermore, estates (heirs or assigns) of either category are entitled to
receive compensation if the death occurred between 1948 and the date of the
application. Subject to the territorial link inherent in the requirement of deportation
from France, there is no nationality requirement. Whilst the incompatibility of the
programme with other pre-existing compensation schemes rules out claims from
citizens of certain nationalities,112 anyone can apply (ie, not just US nationals).
The US provided applicants with a statement of claim form, which required them
to provide ‘all available identifying information and documentation regarding the
relevant individual’s deportation from France during World War II, including if
possible the date, convoy, and place of departure and arrival of such deportation’.
The form also reminded applicants of the criminal implications in making a false
statement.
The amount of compensation envisaged was significantly higher than those
awarded in the schemes discussed thus far. According to the estimates released by
the claims programme, survivors would receive US$204,000 and all surviving
spouses whose deported spouse died prior to 1948 would receive US$51,000.
Surviving spouses of deportees who died in or after 1948 would receive US$750
for each year after the deportee’s death. Estates of survivors or surviving spouses
would receive a fraction of the amounts above, calculated on the period of survival of
the eligible individual during the 1948–2015 period.113
A comment on the size of the payments is in order.114 The negotiating history
shows that the allocated amount of US$60 million was arrived at by knowing an
estimate of the number of beneficiaries (486) and that the resulting average com-
pensation of US$100,000 would correspond to roughly 3 years of disability pension
110Ibid, Art 6.
111For more information see https://www.state.gov/notice-regarding-holocaust-deportation-claims-
program-under-u-s-france-agreement/.
112Namely, those of France, Belgium, Poland, the UK, and the former Czechoslovakia. See FAQ
page of the Claims Programme, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/
deportationclaims/250658.htm.
113More specifically, ‘estates of survivors and estates of surviving spouses [would receive] a yearly
percentage of the full $204,000 and $51,000 amounts, respectively. Estates of survivors will receive
$3,000 for each year that the survivor lived, beginning with 1948 and ending in 2015. Estates of
surviving spouses will receive $750 for each year that the surviving spouse lived after the year of the
deportee spouse’s death, again beginning with 1948 and ending in 2015.’ See Claims Programme,
FAQ page (n 112).
114A fuller analysis, providing the basis for the brief remarks in the text, is offered in Ronald
Bettauer, ‘A Measure of Justice for Uncompensated French Railroad Deportees during the Holo-
caust’, ASIL Insights, (1 March 2016), available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/5/
measure-justice-uncompensated-french-railroad-deportees-during-holocaust.
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under French law.115 Though it is difficult to assess the congruity of these calcula-
tions in the abstract, it is possible to note their large relative amount, as well as the
low number of expected beneficiaries, which permitted the adoption of a quasi-
compensatory approach (as opposed to the merely reparatory scheme adopted, for
instance, in the RRF Law).
This scheme is interesting because it has a residual character: it expressly covers
beneficiaries that were excluded from previous schemes. In this light, it might be
comparable to a future Joint Scheme insofar as the latter would essentially cover
IMIs and other victims expressly excluded from the application of the 2001
RRF Law.
V. A Ten-Step Sketch of a Future German-Italian Joint
Scheme
The previous sections sought to provide an overview of selected payment schemes.
While the comparative analysis is beside the point (as the schemes differ widely
along several variables), it is nonetheless possible to identify certain solutions that,
with all due caution, appear appropriate also for the Joint Scheme. In what follows, I
recapitulate some of the lessons learnt from this anthological survey into a ten-step
sketch.
1. Reparation or Compensation
The Joint Scheme would plausibly grant reparation falling short of full compensa-
tion. A reasonable approach would be to consider it an extension of the RRF
payment scheme. Since the whole IMI issue apparently flows from war prisoners
being excluded from the RRF Law, a reliable starting point would be to ensure that
the Joint Scheme produces the effects that the RRF Law could have produced had it
applied to IMIs. Along these lines, it might be helpful to recall the number of IMI
applications that were rejected under the RRF scheme if we are to have a working
estimate of the number of beneficiaries of the Joint Scheme.116 Full compensation
might be an ambitious but impracticable target, let alone a conceptually thorny issue
115Ibid, drawing extensively from the reports of the French National Assembly and the French
Senate.
116According to Italy’s Counter-Memorial in the Jurisdictional Immunities case before the ICJ,
127,000 such applications were rejected; see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v
Italy), Counter-Memorial of Italy of 22 December 2009, para 2.21.
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when (and if) reserved to heirs and descendants.117 The express language of the
DART scheme, which opted for the reparation label, could serve as a template.
2. Funding
That Germany and Italy will both contribute to the finances of the Joint Scheme can
at this stage only be assumed. Multi-source funding is not unprecedented (the
German government and industry both supported the RRF Fund, for instance) and
would facilitate the accumulation of a decently sized budget. Ideally, Germany
would pledge to match Italy’s contribution, so that an example of virtue rather
than strained negotiations might ensure the scheme’s financial capacity. An alterna-
tive method of quantifying the contributions to the fund, suggested by Jörg
Luther,118 could be to measure them against the size of the respective national
populations (roughly 82 million for Germany and 60 million for Italy). A raw
equivalence of 1 person ¼ €x would be tenable and acknowledges population
differences between the two countries in setting the criterion for a comparable
economic contribution. With x ¼ €1, this calculation would roughly amount to a
€140 million fund, which could ensure the payment of roughly €1,000 to a number
of claimants similar to those who saw their applications rejected under the RRF
Law.119 It appears preferable that x > 1 (see next step), unless the estimated number
of applicants is much lower. Interestingly, in one twist of the Japan–South Korean
feud over the issue of comfort women, Korea has strived to increase the legitimacy
of the reparation scheme by unilaterally financing the budget and announcing that
the funds provided by Japan will not be used. In other words, the contribution from
the state to whom the nationality of the victims belong is a powerful gesture: it
avoids the impression that any agreement between the states reflects a political sell-
out.120
117See, generally, Tyler Cowen, ‘How Far Back Should We Go? Why Restitution Should Be
Small’, in Jon Elster (ed), Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge:
CUP 2006), 17-32. Whilst the author mostly refers to restitution, the legitimacy of intergenerational
compensation is similarly dubious. See also Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter
‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
118See Jörg Luther, chapter ‘A Story of “Trials and Errors” that Might Have No Happy End’, in this
volume.
119See n 12.
120See also Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
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3. The Amount Paid to Each Victim
It is perhaps inevitable that IMIs and other victims receive a lump sum rather than
compensation reflecting the specific damage suffered. Most systems described above
adopt this lump-sum approach and the benefits in terms of expediency seem to
outweigh a concern for accuracy, insofar as fair treatment is assured to all applicants.
It is difficult to tell whether the system should envisage only one lump sum or a range
of amounts, corresponding to several types of injustice suffered (for instance, long-
lasting conditions caused by forced labour might warrant a more generous repara-
tion). The DART and RRF schemes opted for graduated amounts, but the latter
essentially lumped all victims into two macro-groups (‘concentration camps’ and
‘others’). The reparation offered to comfort women was also undifferentiated in
amount. In the interest of expediting the processing of claims, the adoption of a
one-size-fits-all quantum should be favourably considered. As to the magnitude of
the payment, it will inevitably depend on the size of the available fund and the
number of eligible applicants. Of the schemes described above, the ones that directly
provided reparation for personal harms (rather than restitution) converged around a
figure of US$50,000 (the DART scheme, the reparation offered to comfort women,
and railroad deportees), but the number of eligible individuals was much smaller
than that of eligible IMIs and other victims. A lump sum in the €10,000–€20,000
bracket might be considered fair given the circumstances. A system of partial
payment mechanisms could be set up, when the estimate of the number of applicants
is particularly difficult and, accordingly, the amount available to each is difficult to
pin down in advance. Partial payments could ensure the possibility of paying late
applications and prevent the premature depletion of funds when the number of
applicants is unexpectedly high or the available budget is insufficient to cover full
payment to every applicant. Once all applications are processed, the residual funds
can be distributed to make up for what reparations remain, or even fund further
projects if any money is left unallocated.
4. The Management of the Fund and the Organs Overseeing Its
Distribution
Again, it might be worth looking at the RRF scheme as a template. The Joint Scheme
would be run by a body participated in equal measure by the German and Italian
governments, that might decide to integrate its structure with representatives from
civil society, victims’ associations, and technical experts. The body tasked with the
review of applications and liquidation of claims would reflect this balanced make-
up, and operate as an administrative office, as in the DART experience, with an
internal capacity to perform, upon request, the review of individual decisions.
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5. The Eligibility Criteria
Specific criteria should be drafted to ensure that beneficiaries correspond to the
categories left out of the RRF Law: primarily war prisoners subjected to forced
labour, but other internees and victims of mass killings should also be included.
Limiting reparation to Italian citizens (unlike the French banks scheme) might be
understandable since Italy would be responsible for the Scheme’s funding. A
possibility worth discussing is that claims be aggregated into mass claims (as in
the Eritrea/Ethiopia scheme), or at least that the governing body make available
partially pre-filled application forms for prospective applicants. Forms could be
divided into categories, according to the distinguishing features of the crime at
stake and the factual coordinates (provenance of the applicant, timeframe, location,
and conditions of the killing/internment/forced labour). The Joint Scheme would
have the same advantage as the UNCC, which reviewed the claims against Iraq: the
issue of responsibility would not be in question. Since the Joint Scheme would most
probably warrant reparation rather than compensation for specific damages, the issue
of causation and the determination of quantum would also be minimized in the
proceedings. A mere scrutiny of eligibility could suffice.
6. The Treatment of Heirs
The notion of descendants being eligible for compensation is not immediately
intuitive. On the one hand, it defies the immediate realization that compensation
should benefit the individual harmed and provide a modicum of relief for the direct
victim rather than material enrichment for their family. On the other hand, two
circumstances might militate in favour of providing reparation to heirs as a means to
achieve fairness. First, the death of the victim might be a precise consequence of the
injustice—especially in the case of mass killings, but also when the suffering of
forced labour takes a permanent toll on a person’s health. Second, the legal deadlock
has inevitably entailed that the death of multiple victims might have occurred before
the granting of reparation, which is an odious side effect of the slow course of justice
(a second-order instance of injustice). In that light, ‘the rough intuition is that, in
strictly comparative terms, there is no better stand-in for the deceased payees—a
view that seems vague and difficult to defend, but that strikes many as superior to the
alternative of awarding no money at all’.121 Moreover, relatives of the Italian victims
have arguably suffered directly from the crimes committed, especially those causing
death or permanent bodily harm. In some respect, therefore, the heirs are also direct
victims of the injustice. The Joint Scheme would be too little too late, but it could be
understood as a form of ‘rough justice’122 and its shortcomings might be acceptable
121Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 8.
122Ibid.
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if certain safeguards were implemented. One such safeguard concerns the eligibility
of heirs: Italian victims are either dead or elderly. Without a specific mechanism to
avoid delays frustrating its goal, the whole exercise would be emptied of meaning. If
anything, this scenario would exacerbate rather than remedy the injustice. Reduced
payments to victims’ heirs and assigns are common (for instance, consider the
calculation used in the liquidation of US/French Railroad Deportees’ claims and
the pay-outs to the families of Korean comfort women) and might represent an
acceptable compromise. Another solution might be to establish a cut-off date (for
instance, February 1999, on the model of the RRF scheme) and allow the heirs to
claim reparation on behalf of eligible persons deceased thereafter.
7. The Standard and Burden of Proof
One recurring feature of the payment schemes described above is the bestowment
upon the claimants of evidentiary duties that are softer than normally expected in
litigation (see, eg, the UNCC, the DART, the Eritrea/Ethiopia scheme and the US
Banks and Railroads schemes). This staple of reparation processes is certainly fit for
the Joint Scheme. More to the point, Germany could pledge to retrieve the applica-
tions filed with the RRF competent organizations by IMIs and process their claims
automatically. In any event, applicants shall be expected to provide evidence of their
identity and nationality and a template form reporting their account of the relevant
circumstances of internment and forced labour. The form might facilitate the task by
providing some pre-determined choices as regards places and dates, relating to
known historical patterns of wrongdoing and documented flows of IMIs and other
forced laborers. Applicants should be warned of the sanctions attached to the making
of false statements; conversely, their affidavits, if complete, plausible and not
contradicted, should warrant reparation even in the absence of other supporting
documentation.
8. The Involvement of Victims
The Joint Scheme should include specific safeguards for offering satisfaction to the
Italian victims, besides and independently of any monetary payment.123 Specific
means to do so could include: issuing official declarations and individual letters to
123Satisfaction is listed among the basic forms of reparation that states should warrant in the UN
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitar-
ian Law, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/147, 16 December
2005; see, in particular, principle 22. See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in
Dualism’, in this volume.
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restore the victims’ dignity and assume responsibility (possibly, and when appro-
priate, on the part of both states), establishing commemorations and tributes to the
victims, and including an account of the injustices in educational materials.124 It is
equally important that the victims—possibly through the representative associa-
tions—are consulted during the negotiation stage and subsequently involved in the
governance of the scheme. Involvement of victims might be the critical element
making an otherwise unpalatable payment acceptable.125 The offer of multiple
non-monetary remedies proved beneficial in the DART scheme and catered effec-
tively to the victims’ fundamental need for closure and reconciliation.126 The
opposite might be said of the comfort women scheme, in which monetary repara-
tions were perceived to be unsatisfactory by some of the victims and a large share of
South Korean public opinion. As Korea and Japan have learnt the hard way, memory
and respect for victims might save the day when reparation cannot make the victims
whole.127
9. Legal Peace
Germany will likely insist on the insertion of language specifying that any payment
under the Joint Scheme would be made out of comity and a sense of moral and
historical justice, rather than under any legal obligation. Moreover, in the current
scenario Germany is satisfactorily shielded from individual actions by the law of
sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to consider the Joint
Scheme an adequate opportunity to provide legal peace to Germany from the claims
of Italian victims brought before any alternative forum.128 The system of individual
waivers, state commitment to redirect court actions and express relinquishment,
common to some of the schemes described above (check, in particular, the language
of the two US/French agreements), would serve as an appropriate model for the Joint
Scheme.
124See ibid, lets d), e), g), h).
125Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 11: ‘[W]hether partial payment is better than nothing should
depend on the political process by which the payment is accomplished, on the perceived alterna-
tives, and on the accompanying symbolism.’
126Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 147, recorded the beneficial effects of the engaging confer-
encing sessions offered by the DART programme: ‘[C]omplainants reported immediate therapeutic
benefits and a high level of satisfaction that their concerns had been thoroughly acknowledged and
addressed.’ These effects were recorded in the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim
Report; see n 50.
127Christopher Kutz, ‘Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk’,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004), 277-312, at 312.
128See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
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10. Speed
This element explains itself. Beating around the bush is an indecent strategy given
the age of the victims who are still alive.
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